

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08247 021451Z

65

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
----- 061961

R 021245Z NOV 76
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2183
INFO AMCONSUL KARACHI

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 8247

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, AEMR, ASEC, LE, PLO
SUBJECT: EMBASSY SECURITY AND EVACUATION PLANNING

REF: (A) STATE 266135, (B) BEIRUT 8038

1. EMBASSY UNDERSTANDS DEPT'S REASONS FOR TURNING DOWN OUR REQUEST FOR FOUR ADDITIONAL MARINES. IN FACT, IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT THREAT OF ATTACK AGAINST EMBASSY HAS LESSENED SINCE OCT 21 DEASE-FIRE AND MAY BE FURTHER REDUCED DURING NEXT TWO WEEKS IF ARAB LEAGUE FORCE IS DEPLOYED AS PLANNED AND CEASE-FIRE HOLD.

2. REF A SUGGESTS DEPT'S VIEW OF OUR PRINCIPAL SECURITY PROBLEM DIFFERS FROM OURS. DEPT APPARENTLY BELIEVES THAT MAJOR CONSIDERATION IS KEEPING NUMBERS OF USG PERSONNEL AS LOW AS POSSIBLE IS TO MINIMIZE EVACUATION PROBLEMS AND TO ENABLE ALL PERSONNEL TO BE TAKEN OUT IN A SINGLE HELICOPTER IN AN EMERGENCY SITUATION. WE DO NOT THINK NUMBERS OF POTENTIAL EVACUEES IS THIS CRUCIAL OR THAT ONE-SHOT HELICOPTER EVACUATION IS A VIABLE OPTION, FOR BOTH SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN REASONS. FROM SECURITY POINT OF VIEW, A HELICOPTER EVACUATION IN A NON-PERMISSIVE OR HOSTILE ATMOSPHERE WOULD BE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS, BOTH FOR HELICOPTER CREW AND EVACUEES.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08247 021451Z

IF SITUATION HAD DETERIORATED TO POINT WHERE SUCH

AN EVACUATION WERE NECESSARY, IT COULD NOT RPT NOT BE DONE WITHOUT ATTRACTING ATTENTION AND HOSTILE FIRE. IF PERMISSION FOR SUCH AN EVACUATION COULD BE OBTAINED FROM LOCAL AUTHORITIES, THEY WOULD PRESUMABLY ALSO GRANT PERMISSION FOR EVACUATION BY ROAD, WHICH WE UNDERSTAND IS DEPT'S PREFERRED OPTION AS WELL AS OURS. FROM HUMANITARIAN POINT OF VIEW, IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR US TO SURREPITITIOUSLY CLOSE EMBASSY AND STEAL AWAY DURING A DIFFICULT PERIOD, LEAVING AMERICANS AT AUB, AUH, IC AND ACS ON THEIR OWN. DEPENDING ON CIRCUMSTANCES OF OUR EVACUATION, THESE AMCITS MIGHT EVEN BE EXPOSED TO RETALIATION BY LOCAL AUTHORIEIS AFTER WE HAD GONE. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO THE HARD-CORE NUMBER (25-40) OF LEBANESE LOCALS WHO HAVE LOYALLY REMAINED ON THE JOB FOR THE LAST 18 MONTHS.

3. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, THE MAJOR THREAT HAS BEEN A SUDDEN, UNEXPECTED AND PROBABLY SHORT-LIVED ATTACK ON THE CHANCERY. OBVIOUSLY IF WE ARE FACED WITH A DISCIPLINED, OVERWHELMING FORCE, WE WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO NEGOTIATE AN EVACUATION, AFTER ESSENTIAL DESTRUCTION OF RECORDS AND EQUIPMENT. BUT IF ATTACK IS BY UNDISCIPLINED AND/OR REJECTIONIST GROUP, THEY MAY NOT BE INTERESTED IN TALKING. ALTHOUGH LIKELIHOOD OF ATTACK BY SUCH A GROUP IS LESS NOW THAN WHEN REF B WAS DRUAFTED, WE STILL THINK, FOR REASONS OUTLINED REFTTEL, THAT IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO ASSIGN FOUR ADDITIONAL MSG'S TO THIS EMBASSY. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE ANY CRISIS, WE THINK THIS SHOULD BE DONE AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE. WE DOUBT THERE WOULD BE ANY SPECIAL RISKS INVOLVED IN MOVING THESE MEN FROM DAMASCUS UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, AND SECURITY ON BEIRUT-DAMASCUS ROAD IS LIKELY TO IMPROVE IN COMING WEEKS.

4. OUR CONTACTS WITH ARAB LEAGUE REPRESENTATIVES RE SECURITY HAVE BEEN IN ABEYANCE WHILE BOTH AL-KHULI AND GENERAL GHUNAYM WERE IN CAIRO. HOWEVER, BOTH HAVE NOW RETURNED. CHARGE HOPES TO MEET WITH CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 08247 021451Z

AL-KHULI SOON TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR EMBASSIES IN WEST BEIRUT IN LIGHT CAIRO SUMMIT DECISIONS. CHARGE WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO CONSULT WITH FRENCH AND BRITISH COLLEAGUES ON THIS SUBJECT. WE, TOO, ARE NOT OVERLY IMPRESSED WITH SHA'AR AND OUR RECOMMENDATION REF B WAS NOT BASED SOLELY ON HIS ADVANCE. WE HAVE SOUTHT AND WILL SEEK ADVICE FROM OTHER SOURCES. HOWEVER, HE IS STILL DG

OF INTERNAL SECURITY, AND WE BELIEVE HIS VIEWS ARE
WORTH CONSIDERING.
LANE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PROTECTIVE SECURITY, EVACUATION PLANS, EMBASSIES, SECURITY GUARDS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 02 NOV 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976BEIRUT08247
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760408-1002
From: BEIRUT
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19761192/aaaadbhs.tel
Line Count: 118
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 76 STATE 266135, 76 BEIRUT 8038
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 14 JUN 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <14 JUN 2004 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <14 JUN 2004 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: EMBASSY SECURITY AND EVACUATION PLANNING
TAGS: PINS, AEMR, ASEC, LE, PLO
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006